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Highlights 
 
• 
Patients with PNESs self-reported a lower self-esteem than healthy controls. 
• 
Patients with PNESs self-reported a lower self-esteem than those with epilepsy. 
• 
Implicit–explicit self-esteem discrepancies were larger in the group with PNESs. 
• 
There was a strong relationship between explicit–implicit SE discrepancies and PNESs. 
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Abstract 
 
Purpose 
 
Self-esteem (SE), or one's sense of competence and worth, is reduced in many mental and physical 
disorders. Low SE is associated with perceived stigma and disability and poor treatment outcomes. 
The present study examined implicit and explicit SE (automatic and deliberate views about the self) 
in people with epilepsy and people with psychogenic nonepileptic seizures (PNESs). Discrepancies 
between implicit SE and explicit SE have been found to correlate with psychological distress in 
disorders often associated with PNESs but are relatively unexplored in PNESs. We hypothesized that, 
compared with epilepsy, PNESs would be associated with lower self-reported SE and greater 
discrepancies between implicit SE and explicit SE. 
 
Methods 
 
Thirty adults with PNESs, 25 adults with epilepsy, and 31 controls without a history of seizures were 
asked to complete the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale as a measure of explicit SE and an Implicit 
Relational Assessment Procedure as a measure of implicit SE. The State–Trait Anxiety Inventory and 
Patient Health Questionnaire—15 (a somatic symptom inventory) were also administered. 
 
Results 
 
We found significant group differences in explicit (p < 0.001) but not implicit SE. Patients with PNESs 
reported lower SE than the other groups. No group differences were found in implicit SE. Implicit–
explicit SE discrepancies were larger in the group with PNESs than in the other groups (p < 0.001). 
Higher frequency of PNESs (but not epileptic seizures) was associated with lower explicit SE (rs = − 
.83, p < 0.01) and greater SE discrepancies (i.e., lower explicit relative to implicit SE; rs = .65, p < 
0.01). These relationships remained significant when controlling for anxiety and somatization. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Patients with PNESs had lower explicit SE than those with epilepsy or healthy controls. In keeping 
with our expectations, there were greater discrepancies between implicit SE and explicit SE among 
patients with PNESs than in the other groups. Our results, including the strong relationship between 
PNES frequency, anxiety, and explicit–implicit SE discrepancies, support the interpretation that 
PNESs serve to reduce cognitive dissonance, perhaps protecting patients' implicit SE. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Psychogenic nonepileptic seizures (PNESs) bear a superficial resemblance to epileptic seizures. 
However, whereas the experiences and behaviors associated with epileptic seizures are caused by 
abnormal electrical activity in the brain, most PNESs are considered a dissociative reaction to 
threatening situations, sensations, emotions, thoughts, or memories [1]. 
 
Psychogenic nonepileptic seizures are best conceptualized as a biopsychosocial condition with a 
psychological profile which, on a range of dimensions, is quite different from that found in patients 
with epilepsy: many studies have demonstrated that individuals with PNESs report a higher 
prevalence rate of trauma and PTSD relative to people with epilepsy [2] as well as higher levels of 
somatization [3]. Compared with epilepsy, individuals with PNESs are also more likely to have 
personality disorders, especially the borderline type [4]. On the other hand, studies have not found 
clear differences between patients with PNESs and those with epilepsy in terms of the prevalence of 
anxiety and depression [5], alexithymia (i.e., difficulty experiencing and expressing affect) [6], or self-
reported levels of dissociation [3]. Nevertheless, the prevalence rates of such disorders are higher 
than those seen in healthy controls. 
 
One construct that is underexplored with respect to understanding PNESs is self-esteem (SE). There 
are strong links between SE, which is typically defined as a sense of competence and worth, and 
psychological disorders including depression, anxiety disorders, personality disorders, and eating 
disorders [7]. One hypothesis is that low SE creates vulnerability to stress (e.g., [8]). Although SE has 
been criticized for not consistently moderating the impact of daily hassles on mood, it has been 
shown to significantly lessen the impact of such stressors on physical symptoms [9]. Self-esteem has 
also been found to mediate the relationship between insecure attachment and PTSD 
symptomatology in survivors of interpersonal trauma, emotional abuse, and psychopathology [10] 
and [11]. Despite these links and the documented association of PNESs with trauma and increased 
rates of insecure attachment [12], there is only limited evidence of SE levels in PNESs. 
 
Given the prevalence of psychological dysfunction and trauma mentioned above, in addition to the 
psychosocial impact of the disorder, individuals with PNESs are often characterized as vulnerable to 
low SE [13]; however, the single study that has examined this construct in this patient group used a 
measure of explicit SE only—limiting a deeper understanding of attitudes about the self in PNESs. 
This prior study found that SE was indeed lower in individuals with PNESs compared to healthy 
controls but that, on this measure, those with PNESs did not differ significantly from those with 
epilepsy [14]. Furthermore, while no correlations have been found between seizure frequency and 
SE in epilepsy [15], this relationship has not been studied in PNESs. 
 
 
 
In addition to controlled/conscious processing (also referred to as explicit cognition), much of 
information processing, including about the self, occurs automatically unconsciously (implicit 
cognition; [16]). The term implicit refers to hypothetical psychological attributes that are 
introspectively inaccessible but that can be assessed through reaction times, word associations, or 
other non-self-report measures. Thus, SE can be either a deliberate evaluation of self (explicit SE) 
[17] or an impulsive, automatic, and overlearned evaluation (implicit SE) [18]. Implicit SE and explicit 
SE are considered to be relatively enduring characteristics, shaped by both positive and negative 
experiences [17] and [19]. Early trauma or childhood abuse, particularly rejection, critical attacks, 
contempt, and/or devaluation, can all undermine a child's emerging identity [11], leading to victims 
adopting a negative self-image. In turn, this can have long lasting effects on their character and 
behavior [20]. While childhood experiences may have a significant role in shaping SE, both implicit SE 
and explicit SE are considered vulnerable to events across the lifespan including adulthood. 
Someone with a relatively high SE, for example, may find themselves with a change of 
socioeconomic status or decline in physical health and, over a period of time, develop a less positive 
self-view [21]. Although implicit SE and explicit SE are susceptible to change, Baccus, Baldwin, and 
Packer [19] suggest that such divergences between the two interfere with a person's ability to 
benefit from positive social feedback. Notably, discrepancies in either direction are thought to be 
maladaptive and have been found to correlate with psychological distress in depression [22] and 
borderline personality disorder [23], both of which are associated with childhood trauma [24] and 
[25] and PNESs [3] and [4]. 
 One explanation for why discrepant self-evaluations are problematic comes from cognitive 
dissonance theory [26], which proposes that conflicting thoughts, ideas, beliefs, or behaviors 
produce uncomfortable feelings and tension or anxiety. Because of an innate motivational drive to 
avoid inconsistency, behaviors can become irrational and maladaptive in an attempt to restore or 
maintain consonance [26]. Similarly, Steele argues that dissonance is rooted in threats to the self 
and that individuals engage in processes of dissonance reduction to defend the self from such 
threats [27]. Utilizing implicit methodology, Rydell, McConnell, and Mackie concluded that 
dissonance and dissonance-related discomfort increase when there is divergence on implicit and 
explicit measures [28]. Furthermore, discrepant implicit–explicit SE in either direction is associated 
with more dissonance-reducing behaviors. For instance, Jordan and colleagues showed that 
individuals with high explicit but low implicit SE were more defensive and rationalized their decisions 
more than those with consistent implicit–explicit SE [29]. As implicit–explicit discrepancies may be 
associated with anxiety, the present study builds on our previous findings examining the relationship 
between discrepancies in anxiety and PNES frequency [30]. 
 
The studies and theoretical rationale discussed above suggest that both implicit SE and explicit SE 
may play a key part in PNESs, and yet, previous work has only examined explicit SE. This study's 
primary aim was to compare groups (PNESs, epilepsy, controls) on implicit and explicit measures of 
SE. The secondary aims were to explore implicit–explicit SE discrepancies and to explore correlations 
between SE, anxiety, and seizure frequency. We hypothesized that people with PNESs would report 
lower SE and would show larger discrepancies in implicit and explicit measures of SE than people 
with epilepsy or nonclinical controls. We also anticipated that discrepancies in implicit and explicit 
measures of SE would be related to greater frequency of PNESs as PNESs may be conceptualized as 
an attempt to avoid distress and reduce arousal. 
 
2. Method 
 
2.1. Participants 
 
As part of a larger study [30], 30 adults with PNESs and 25 adults with epilepsy (13 
structural/metabolic epilepsy, five genetic generalized epilepsy, and seven unclassifiable epilepsy) 
were recruited from outpatient seizure clinics at the Sheffield Teaching Hospital NHS Foundation 
Trust between February and September 2012. All diagnoses were made by neurologists specializing 
in the treatment of seizures, and only those whose diagnoses were supported by a previous video-
EEG recording of a typical seizure were included. Patients with mixed seizure disorders (people with 
both epilepsy and PNESs) were not included. Thirty-one adults matched on gender, age, and 
education who reported no history of seizures served as a nonclinical control group. These 
participants were recruited through a poster advertisement across the hospital and university. All 
participants were at least 18 years old. Individuals unable to complete self-report questionnaires 
unaided or not fluent in English and those physically unable to use a computer were excluded. 
 
2.2. Ethical approval 
 
The proposal was approved by Leeds Research and Ethics Committee (REC) and the Research Office 
of the Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust. All participants provided written informed 
consent in accordance with the REC guidance and Helsinki Good Clinical Practice. 
 
2.3. Measures 
 
2.3.1. Demographic and medical history 
 
Basic demographic information (age, gender, level of education) and seizure frequency were self-
reported. Participants were also asked to specify in an open-ended fashion any current or previous 
mental health problems. 
 
2.3.2. Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (RSS) 
 
The RSS was employed to examine explicit SE [31]. It is a 10-item questionnaire which asks for 
responses on a 4-point Likert scale from 0 to 3 with endpoints labeled strongly agree and strongly 
disagree. Scores range from 0 to 30, with higher scores reflecting a greater sense of worth and 
achievement. This measure is one of the most widely used SE measures. It has been found to have 
high internal consistency (alpha of .88) and test–retest reliability (r = .82). In the current study, the 
Cronbach's alpha was .90. 
 
2.3.3. Spielberger State–Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) 
 
The STAI is an explicit self-report measure of state and trait anxiety [32]. It is composed of forty 
questions with response options ranging from 1 (not at all/almost never) to 4 (very much so/almost 
always) on a Likert scale. Total scores range from 20 to 80, with higher scores reflecting higher levels 
of anxiety. The STAI was chosen because of its ability to examine both state and trait constructs, 
with test–retest reliability of .40 and .86, respectively. It also has concurrent validity with other 
measures of anxiety, having correlations around .80 [33]. The Cronbach's alpha scores for the state 
and trait measures in this study were .93 and .95. 
 
2.3.4. Patient Health Questionnaire—15 (PHQ-15) 
 
The PHQ-15 was used as a self-report screen for somatization and somatic symptoms [34]. The 
measure comprises 15 somatic symptoms, each scored 0 (“not bothered at all”), 1 (“bothered a 
little”), or 2 (“bothered a lot”). Total scores range from 0 to 30 and are classified as reflecting 
minimum (0–4), mild (5–9), moderate (10–14), or severe (15 +) somatization. The measure was not 
developed as a stand-alone diagnostic tool but was used to supplement other clinical information. 
The PHQ-15 has good internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha of 0.80) and moderate associations 
between items. 
 
2.3.5. Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) 
 
The IRAP is a contemporary latency-based measurement of implicit cognition which assumes that 
the strength of specific relations is reflected in participant response times [35]. The basic IRAP 
principle is that average response latencies are relatively shorter on blocks that support the 
participant's impulsive (implicit) beliefs compared to blocks that do not support their beliefs. The SE 
IRAP (IRAPSE) stimulus set (Table 1) was developed by the authors to reflect a model of SE similar to 
that underpinning the explicit RSS. 
 
 
Stimuli and responses were presented on a portable laptop and recorded by the IRAP software. 
Participants read through instructions presented visually by the experimenter (available as web 
content). These instructions explained the IRAP procedure and how to complete the task and 
highlighted that accuracy and speed in responding were a prerequisite to progress to the test phase. 
Participants were specifically informed that it would sometimes be necessary to respond to the 
stimuli in a manner consistent with their beliefs and sometimes in ways that may be inconsistent 
with their beliefs. Participants were instructed to derive the correct response style for each block of 
trials but were not told which trials were considered to be “consistent” or “inconsistent”. To ensure 
understanding of the task and minimize random responding, each participant was administered at 
least two practice blocks until they achieved an average response time of less than 3 s and an 
accuracy rating above 80% (in line with previous research [36]). 
 
Each trial was comprised of a category label (“I am” or “Others are”) appearing at the top of the 
screen, one of 12 target words in the center (e.g., “capable”, “proud”, and “worthless”), and the two 
response options “True” and “False” in the bottom corners. All the stimuli (label, target, and 
response options) were presented simultaneously (Fig. 1) and remained on the screen until the 
participant selected one of the relational terms by pressing the ‘D’ key for ‘true’ or the ‘K’ key for 
‘false’. Choosing the relational term deemed “correct” for a particular trial removed all stimuli from 
the screen for 400 ms before the next trial was presented. Choosing the relational term that was 
deemed “incorrect” for that particular trial produced a red “X” in the center of the screen. To 
remove the X and proceed to the 400-millisecond intertrial interval, participants were required to 
select the correct response option. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  
Examples of the four trial types in the IRAPSE. 
 
Arrows with text boxes showing “Consistent”/“Inconsistent” did not appear on-screen and are 
shown for illustrative purposes only. 
An accurate response was dependent on whether a “consistent” or “inconsistent” trial was 
administered. During “consistent” blocks of the IRAPSE, participants were required to categorize 
themselves as valuable (e.g., I am — valuable — True and I am — worthless — False) and others as 
worthless (e.g., Others are — worthless — True and Others are — valuable — False). During 
“inconsistent” blocks, the response contingencies were reversed. Trials were deemed to be 
“consistent” and “inconsistent” based on findings for the ‘universality’ of self-positive implicit biases 
(e.g., [37]). Fig. 1 illustrates the two category labels with their respective “consistent” and 
“inconsistent” stimuli. 
 
During the IRAP, participants were exposed to six test blocks, alternating between “consistent” and 
“inconsistent” blocks, each with 24 trials. The category label and target stimuli within each block 
were randomized with the constraint that stimuli were not presented more than three times with 
each sample. Visual instructions after each test block indicated that the next block would involve 
reversing the previously correct and incorrect responses. 
 
2.4. Procedure 
 
Participants first completed the self-report measures (demographics, RSS, STAI, and PHQ-15). The 
order of the questionnaires was randomized using an online research randomizer (available from 
http://www.randomizer.org). Participants then completed the IRAP task while their questionnaires 
were proofread for missing data and were followed up with a debrief. 
 
2.5. IRAP data preparation 
 
Raw latency data from the IRAP (time in milliseconds from trial onset to participant response) were 
converted into a D measure (D-IRAP) consistent with current implicit measurement research 
outlined by Barnes-Holmes and colleagues [35] (also available as web content linked to this article). 
The D transformation serves to minimize the impact of individual variability relating to extraneous 
variables such as age, cognitive ability, and/or motor skills, offering a cleaner response-latency 
paradigm measurement [38]. To facilitate interpretation of the results and comparability of 
evaluative responses toward self vs. others, the computed D-IRAP 'others are' trial scores were 
reverse-scored prior to statistical analysis. Consequently, in analyses reported below, positive scores 
are indicative of high regard and negative scores reflect the reverse. Scores reflecting implicit 
‘esteem for others’ are thus tuned in the same direction as implicit and explicit SE scores: i.e., higher 
positive scores indicate greater SE/more positive self-evaluations. 
 
2.6. Statistical analysis 
 
Statistical analysis was completed with IBM SPSS for Windows version 20.0. As the explicit data 
violated the assumption of homogeneity of variance–covariance, several analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) were conducted. To conservatively protect against multiple testing errors, the alpha 
criterion for these separate ANOVAs was adjusted using sequential Holm–Bonferroni correction 
(from the smallest to largest observed p-value, the threshold for significance of omnibus F statistics 
consequently ranged from p < 0.0167 to p < 0.05). Analyses of variance were followed by Tukey's 
HSD tests to determine pairwise differences with correction for multiple comparisons. 
 
For the purpose of computing implicit–explicit discrepancy scores and in line with previous work 
[19], both explicit (RSS) and implicit (D-IRAPSE self trial) indices of SE were first transformed into z-
scores (enabling direct comparability) using the appropriate whole sample mean and SD. For 
example, individual explicit SE z-scores were computed as: z-RSS = (observed RSS score − grand 
mean RSS / grand SD). Computed z-scores were then used to compute discrepancy scores by 
subtracting the explicit z-score (z-RSS) from the implicit z-score (z-transformed D-IRAPSE self trials). 
In this way, higher positive discrepancy scores were indicative of lower explicit relative to implicit SE. 
Transformed z-scores were only used in computation of the SE discrepancy scores; untransformed 
scores were used in analyses of the variables from which these discrepancy scores were derived 
(preserving original scaling). 
 
To ensure a sufficient sample size, an a priori power calculation was performed. The estimated effect 
size was based on relevant findings by Moore et al. [14]: these authors examined differences in 
explicit self-esteem between (1) individuals with PNESs, (2) individuals with epilepsy, and (3) healthy 
controls and found a large effect size (Cohen's f = .43). Power analysis using the G*Power software 
[39] indicated that, given the number of groups in the study (3) and an alpha level of .05, a sample 
size of at least 57 (19 per group) was required to provide sufficient power (80%) to detect an effect 
of similar magnitude (f = .43). To account for planned multiple testing, we further computed the 
sample size that would be required after applying Holm–Bonferroni correction to control the 
familywise error rate — i.e., after adjusting the alpha level from .05 to .0167. At the adjusted alpha 
level of .0167 (with other parameters held constant), a sample size of at least 75 (25 per group) was 
required to retain 80% power. 
 
2.7. Preliminary analyses 
 
Preliminary analyses were used to determine the validity of the IRAPSE. Positive D-IRAP scores 
suggest a general bias toward positive views, and negative D-IRAP scores suggest a general bias 
toward negative views. The zero point indicates no bias. As expected, the IRAPSE showed a 
significant effect for the self-positive response bias as indexed by significant one-sample t-tests in all 
diagnostic groups (ps ≤ 0.001). This is in line with (1) previous SE IRAP effects (e.g., [40] and [41]) and 
(2) findings for the ‘universality’ of self-positive implicit biases (e.g., [37]). An odd–even split-half 
procedure (applying the Spearman–Brown formula) was used to assess the reliability of the IRAP 
[42]. Split-half reliability was 0.85, which is comparable to other IRAP measures [43] and other 
implicit SE measures [44] and suggested that the IRAPSE reliably detected unintentional self-
evaluations (in this case, implicit SE). 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1. Demographics 
 
Demographic variables available for analysis pertained to gender, age, education, seizure frequency, 
and self-reported mental health difficulties (Table 2). Groups differed significantly in relation to self-
reported mental health problems, trait anxiety, and somatic symptoms. Participants who self-
reported having a mental health problem all stated that they had either depression or an anxiety 
disorder or both. However, the groups with PNESs and epilepsy did not differ significantly in terms of 
the proportion of patients above the STAI psychopathology cutoff. A chi-square goodness-of-fit test 
revealed no significant difference in the frequency of PNESs or epileptic seizures. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  
Demographic characteristics of the three groups. 
 
Controls (n = 31) 
Group with epilepsy (n = 25) 
Group with PNESs (n = 30) 
p 
Gender (%) 
 Females 
21 (67.7) 
16 (64.0) 
22 (73.3) 
 Males 
10 (32.3) 
9 (36.0) 
8 (26.7) 
0.75 
Mean age (SD) 
42.97 (13.93) 
39.40 (16.49) 
40.87 (12.88) 
 0.65 
Highest level of education (%) 
 Secondary school 
6 (19.4) 
4 (16.0) 
8 (26.7) 
 College/sixth form (a) 
10 (32.3) 
9 (36.0) 
12 (40.0) 
 Diploma 
7 (22.6) 
5 (20.0) 
5 (16.7) 
 Undergraduate degree 
7 (22.6) 
2 (8.0) 
4 (13.3) 
 Postgraduate qualification 
1 (3.2) 
5 (20.0) 
1 (3.3) 
0.43 
Number reporting mental health problems (%) 
 None 
23 (74.2) 
17 (68.0) 
14 (46.7) 
 Past 
6 (19.4) 
5 (20.0) 
4 (13.3) 
 Present 
2 (6.5) 
3 (12.0) 
12 (40.0) 
0.02 
State anxiety mean (SD) 
34.87 (11.19) 
36.88 (9.45) 
42.10 (13.67) 
> 0.05 
Trait anxiety mean (SD) 
38.23 (10.65) 
42.84 (8.52) 
50.10 (15.09) 
.001 
Number above STAI psychopathology cutoff (%) 
1 (3.2) 
2 (8.0) 
7 (23.3) 
0.16 
Somatic symptoms — mean PHQ-15 score (SD) 
5.00 (3.33) 
6.60 (3.46) 
14.80 (6.19) 
< 0.001 
Number of seizures reported per month 
 Mean (SD) 
– 
4.38 (7.48) 
7.36 (7.45) 
0.09 
 Median (IQR) 
– 
1.0 (0.0–7.3) 
6.0 (2.0–12.0) 
a 
In the UK 'sixth form' describes school years 12 to 13 which are optional. 
 
3.2. Explicit SE 
 
A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to examine differences in explicit SE 
as measured by the RSS. There was a statistically significant difference for the three different groups 
(F(2,83) = 9.71, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.19). Comparisons using Tukey's HSD test indicated that the mean 
score for the group with PNESs (M = 14.70, SD = 6.30) was significantly lower than that for the 
control group (M = 20.68, SD = 4.82) and the group with epilepsy (M = 18.92, SD = 4.94). The scores 
of the group with epilepsy and the control group did not differ significantly from each other. After 
controlling for self-reported mental health problems, a one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) 
revealed that the between-groups difference in SE scores remained significant (F(2,82) = 5.54, p = 
0.006, ηp2 = 0.12). Because of the group differences reported above, self-reported anxiety and 
somatization were controlled using analysis of covariance, yielding a similar result. 
 
3.3. Implicit SE 
 Nine participants (4 with PNESs, 3 with epilepsy, and 2 controls) were unable to complete the IRAP 
tasks within the set criterion (median response < 3 s, > 80% compliance with response instructions). 
These data were excluded; data from all other participants were retained following the 
transformation of raw latencies into D-IRAP scores. Fig. 2 depicts the mean D-IRAPSE self and others 
scores for the three groups (N = 77). The data show that all groups revealed a bias toward self-as-
positive as illustrated by positive scores. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.  
Mean self and other D-IRAPSE scores for the three groups — controls, epilepsy, and PNESs. Error 
bars represent one standard deviation. 
 
A 3 × 2 mixed repeated analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the D-IRAPSE scores, with 
diagnosis as the between-participants variable and evaluative target (self vs. others) as the within-
participant variable. There was a significant main effect for evaluative target (F(1,74) = 6.25, p = 
0.015, ηp2 = 0.08), indicating that self-evaluative responses (implicit SE; M = 0.29, SD = 0.41) were 
more positive than evaluative responses toward others (implicit other-esteem; M = 0.11, SD = 0.38). 
The analysis revealed no significant interaction between diagnosis and evaluative target, with all 
groups demonstrating similar responses across self- and other-referent trials (F(2,74) = 2.16, p = 
0.122, ηp2 = 0.06). The main effect for diagnosis was also nonsignificant, indicating no differences in 
implicit responding between the three groups (F(2,74) = 0.32, p = 0.725, ηp2 = 0.01). 
 
3.4. Implicit–explicit discrepancies 
 
A one-way between-groups analysis of variance found a statistically significant difference for the 
three groups in SE discrepancy scores (F(2,74) = 4.45, p = 0.015, ηp2 = 0.11). Comparisons using 
Tukey's HSD test indicated that the group with PNESs had significantly larger discrepancies than the 
control group and the group with epilepsy, who did not differ significantly from each other. These 
results are illustrated in Fig. 3. Note that the PNES z-score for implicit self-esteem equals zero. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  
Mean implicit and explicit SE for the three groups — controls, epilepsy and PNESs. The PNES z-score 
for implicit self-esteem equals zero; a significant discrepancy between the two scores is illustrated 
by *p < 0.05. 
 
3.5. Relationships between SE and anxiety 
 
Within-group relationships between SE and (trait) anxiety were investigated using Spearman's rank-
order correlations (Table 3); significance criteria were adjusted for multiple testing using sequential 
Holm–Bonferroni correction. In all three groups, anxiety correlated with both explicit SE and 
discrepant SE, i.e., greater self-reported anxiety was associated with (1) lower self-reported (explicit) 
SE and (2) lower explicit relative to implicit SE. 
 
Table 3.  
Relationships with anxiety. 
Explicit SE 
Implicit SE 
Discrepant SE 
Controls 
− .672⁎⁎ 
− .115 
.53⁎⁎ 
Group with epilepsy 
− .724⁎⁎ 
.056 
.47⁎ 
Group with PNESs 
− .821⁎⁎ 
− .173 
.49⁎ 
 ⁎ 
p < 0.05, significant rs value. 
⁎⁎ 
p < 0.01, significant rs value. 
6. Relationships between SE and seizure frequency 
 
Within-group relationships between SE and seizure frequency were investigated using Spearman's 
rank-order correlations (Table 4); significance criteria were adjusted for multiple testing using 
sequential Holm–Bonferroni correction. In the group with epilepsy, no indices of SE were 
significantly correlated with seizure frequency. In the group with PNESs, seizure frequency 
correlated with both explicit SE and discrepant SE, i.e., greater PNES frequency was associated with 
(1) lower self-reported (explicit) SE and (2) lower explicit relative to implicit SE. These relationships 
remained significant (and of large magnitude) when using partial correlation to control for anxiety 
and somatization. 
Table 4.  
Relationships with seizure frequency. 
Explicit SE 
Implicit SE 
Discrepant SE 
Epilepsy 
.34 
.06 
− .32 
 Controlling for anxiety and somatization 
.35 
.09 
− .21 
PNESs 
− .83⁎⁎ 
.04 
.65⁎⁎ 
 Controlling for anxiety and somatization 
− .71⁎⁎ 
.20 
.52⁎ 
Positive discrepant SE scores indicate that greater seizure frequency is associated with lower explicit 
SE relative to implicit SE. 
⁎ 
p <  0.05, significant rs value. 
⁎⁎ 
p <  0.01, significant rs value. 
 
4. Discussion 
People with PNESs reported lower explicit SE than people with epilepsy and healthy controls. This is 
in contrast to one previous study describing lower explicit SE only among those with epilepsy 
(although means suggested lower SE for those with PNESs as well; [14]). Unique to the present 
study, explicit SE negatively correlated with PNES frequency; however, consistent with previous 
reports, SE was unrelated to the frequency of epileptic seizures [15]. 
 
Given that both epilepsy and PNESs may be associated with stigma [45] and [46], the lower explicit 
SE observed in individuals with PNESs is perhaps more likely to be the product of childhood trauma, 
emotional abuse or neglect, and insecure attachment than of having a stigmatizing seizure disorder 
[12], [47] and [48]. Low explicit SE may be relevant in terms of understanding the etiology of PNESs, 
psychological formulation, and treatment outcome: as reported in patients with PTSD, it may be that 
low SE contributes to the chronification of PNESs [49] and/or mediates the relationship between 
attachment and psychopathology [10]; however, these hypotheses have yet to be tested in this 
patient group. 
 
In addition to explicit SE, uniquely, the present study also examined implicit SE in people with 
seizures. While we did not find significant group differences in implicit SE, there was a significantly 
larger discrepancy between implicit and explicit SE scores in the group with PNESs than in the other 
two groups. Moreover, in the group with PNESs, there was a strong positive correlation between 
self-reported seizure frequency and discrepant SE scores whereby lower explicit relative to implicit 
SE was associated with greater seizure frequency. Further, in all three groups, explicit–implicit 
discrepancies – more specifically, discrepancies reflecting lower explicit relative to implicit SE – were 
associated with greater reported anxiety. Although causality cannot be determined, in that more 
frequent PNESs may result from or lead to lower SE, some possible interpretations of the data are 
discussed below. 
 
The present findings resemble those of a previously reported study [30], which examined the same 
groups of patients with seizures and healthy controls in terms of implicit versus explicit anxiety. In 
that study, we found greater explicit–implicit discrepancies for patients with PNESs and a significant 
relationship between these discrepancy scores and PNES frequency. As in the current study, the 
direction of discrepancy was important: greater seizure frequency was specifically associated with 
higher explicit relative to implicit anxiety. Accounting for the inverse relationship between anxiety 
and self-esteem, a similar pattern was observed in the present findings. As discussed elsewhere with 
respect to anxiety [30], the profile of relatively more normal implicit and low explicit SE may reflect 
what Wilson and colleagues describe as a ‘damaged’ self. Such a profile may identify people whose 
SE has diminished later in life [50]. This suggestion is predicated on the theoretical argument that 
implicit evaluations reflect habitual and more stable tendencies, established much earlier, whereas 
explicit evaluations may be comparatively more changeable, reflecting current constructions of 
available information [16]; consequently, explicit SE may be relatively more sensitive to recent 
experiences such that lower explicit vs. implicit SE may be interpreted as evidence that SE has 
deteriorated over time. Patients with PNESs, in particular, often have limited understanding and 
uncertainty about their condition postdiagnosis, report a lack of postdiagnostic support, and 
experience services as stressful and abandoning [51]. The removal of an erroneous diagnosis of 
epilepsy may change and unsettle patients' identity. Even though the patients in our sample were 
not newly diagnosed, it is possible that such events altered the evaluations that individuals with 
PNESs hold about themselves, which may account for the lower explicit scores. 
 
The pattern of lower explicit and higher implicit SE could also be the result of “successful” 
dissociation whereby patients are protecting implicit cognitions about the self from the effects of 
trauma or distress associated with individual PNESs (or the situations giving rise to PNESs). In an 
attempt to protect against excessive anxiety and maintain SE, it is possible that PNESs serve to “ward 
off” deeper experiences of distress that might challenge one's view of self, thereby preserving their 
implicit SE. 
 
Similarly, implicit SE could also be protected because attacks provide patients with a sense of 
identity or a sense of control, perhaps within a difficult environment, or even rationalizations for 
failure [52]. Low SE may, nevertheless, be reported either because patients with PNESs superficially 
feel a low sense of self-worth or because they are conditioned to project such an image. Further, 
although those with PNESs did not differ from those with epilepsy or controls in implicit SE, both 
patient groups reported a more positive view of others (relative to controls). Therefore, low SE may 
not be due to a deep sense of self as flawed as much as a sense that others are faring better (e.g., 
because others are not experiencing seizures or for other reasons). 
 
We cannot disentangle whether it was explicit scores alone or their discrepancy from the implicit 
measures that accounted for the correlations of the difference between explicit and implicit scores 
with PNES frequency. However, our findings are consistent with previous reports indicating that 
discrepancies between implicit SE and explicit SE are detrimental [53], perhaps supporting a 
cognitive dissonance account of PNESs. Such discrepancies are also associated with greater 
experiential avoidance (which we previously documented in this patient group [30]) and consistent 
with reports that many patients with PNESs lack emotional and psychological awareness [1]. 
Furthermore, the relatively high implicit, low explicit SE profile mirrors that observed in people with 
a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder and depression with suicidal ideation [22] and [23] and 
may be reflective of a fragmented self that is commonly associated with dissociative disorders. 
 
Our data may have significant implications on treatments for PNESs: the fact that higher explicit SE 
was associated with a lower frequency of PNESs attacks suggests that therapies aiming to change 
negative self-views and improve self-worth could reduce PNESs. Several previous studies have 
shown that low self-esteem is a particular risk factor for distress (namely depression) when also 
accompanied by a self-blaming attributional style [9]. More specifically then, our findings support 
the idea that in the context of a self-accepting dialogue, modifying negative and discrepant self-
evaluations and, therefore, reducing cognitive dissonance or stabilizing one's self-image might 
represent mechanisms of change in these approaches. While CBT and psychodynamic therapy are 
the leading published psychological interventions effective for PNESs [54] and [55], there are a range 
of therapies which could address these aspects (e.g., compassion-focused therapy or acceptance and 
commitment therapy), which are evidence-based for a number of comorbidities associated with 
PNESs, and which may be equally as effective for this population. However, these ideas require 
further research. 
 
This was a cross-sectional study that examined SE at one time point, and SE stability has been found 
to have a greater predictive value than SE alone [17]. In addition, it may be useful to examine related 
constructs such as self-compassion, which is an alternative concept to self-esteem but which 
correlates moderately with it and with self-worth stability [56]. Although self-compassion has been 
found to be equivalent to SE in predicting happiness, optimism, and positive affect, unlike SE, it is 
not associated with narcissism [57]. No previous studies have linked PNESs with elevated levels of 
narcissism, and while there is no evidence to suggest that our results were the product of any 
correlation with narcissism, future studies may want to control for this using an appropriate 
validated measure. 
 
Patients were only recruited to this study if they had a firm diagnosis of either epilepsy or PNESs. 
Patients with mixed seizure disorders may have a different profile and should perhaps be included in 
future studies [58]. We also did not record how long patients had been experiencing seizures, 
making it difficult to draw conclusions about the direction of the relationship between the 
psychological variables and PNESs. Although we specified the percentage of participants in each 
group who exceeded the cutoff for psychopathology based on the STAI, we did not record any 
information of formal psychiatric diagnoses and current or previous psychiatric treatment. In 
addition, only the relationship between psychological variables and seizure frequency – rather than 
severity – was explored. Smith and colleagues showed that seizure severity was a predictor of 
psychological variables in epilepsy [15]; therefore, future studies may want to consider the role of 
both severity and frequency and use a more objective method than self-report. Moreover, the 
present study was conducted in patients with refractory seizures receiving current outpatient 
neurology care. It is uncertain to what extent the results can be generalized to patient groups 
elsewhere. 
 
By using the IRAP, this study aimed to provide a more contemporary perspective and addressed not 
only the limitations of relying solely on self-report but also some of the limitations of other measures 
of implicit cognition. Although manipulation checks were in line with previous research and provided 
support for its validity, it is, nevertheless, possible that there are differences in implicit SE in people 
with PNESs and that our measure lacked validity. Other time latency-based measures have also been 
criticized for not reflecting global self-worth and for measuring implicit affect rather than self-
esteem per se [59]. While the IRAP stimuli were developed specifically to reflect dimensions of the 
explicit scale that we used, future studies may want to consider using alternative stimuli or methods. 
 
One strength of the study was the sample size, which exceeded the calculated minimum sample size 
of at least 57 to answer our primary research questions. Multiple ANOVAs were subsequently 
conducted to prevent violating the assumption of analysis of variance–covariance, and while every 
effort was made to correct for multiple testing, it is entirely possible that results for the explicit SE 
finding are inflated and future similar studies may benefit from using a larger sample size to answer 
our secondary research questions more conclusively. This study did not use blinded assessors or any 
scales of effort or social desirability, and while it seems unlikely that differences in explicit SE were 
due to exaggerated responses (i.e., “faking bad”), it is possible that the results were due to a 
response bias [60] or, given that participants opted to take part in the study, a product of selection 
bias. Further, results were similar when controlling for anxiety and somatization, but there was not a 
separate assessment of other neuropsychiatric symptoms or depression, which is closely tied to 
feelings of self-worth and competence. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Our findings suggest that although people with epilepsy and PNESs may be similar in terms of 
implicit self-esteem, those with PNESs have much lower explicit self-esteem and, therefore, there is 
a greater discrepancy between the two. In keeping with studies in patients with other forms of 
psychopathology, the discrepancy between explicit self-esteem and implicit self-esteem correlated 
with markers of distress, i.e., with seizure frequency and anxiety in this patient group with PNES. 
These findings provide evidence that people with PNESs may have an unstable self-image and 
support the notion that attacks function to reduce dissonance or facilitate toleration of distress. We 
propose that therapies which aim to reduce a negative and discrepant self-belief, therefore reducing 
cognitive dissonance or stabilizing patients' self-image, may successfully reduce the impact of PNESs. 
Future studies should examine self-esteem over time and the response of explicit and implicit 
measures of SE to a range of therapeutic modalities. 
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